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he last issue of FMR provided
an arena for ideas on when dis-
placement ends that was both
informative and engaging. Mooney
introduced an integrated approach,
requiring both solutions-based and
needs-based criteria based on a range
of human rights indicators. Frelick
suggested that IDPs who no longer
need international protection are no
longer IDPs. Kalin emphasised that
displacement ends gradually.
However, there was no conclusion,
no clear definition of internal dis-
placement’s end.
Let me offer a simple definition.
Displacement ends when IDPs have
established their place in a self-select-
ed community of choice. What does it
mean for an IDP to ‘establish a place’?
The end of displacement may require
a policy choice on the part of the
authorities or an end to certain condi-
tions but the actual end to the state
of being uprooted must be completed
by the displaced persons themselves.
The displaced persons must feel that
they are in a place and a community
that will not force them to be uproot-
ed again.  
I use the phrase ‘established their
place’ instead of reintegration for a
number of reasons. Whether IDPs are
in a displacement location, are reset-
tled or choose to return to their area
of origin, they need certain settlement
resources in order to establish a place
– resources such as land, water
and/or housing. For instance, housing
is a key issue for displaced people.
Often people in IDP camps who live in
tents but have the opportunity to
build homes will consider themselves
‘settled’ once the home is built. This
is the case in Zhare Dhast IDP camp in
Kandahar as well as the Chaman
Waiting Area on the border of
Pakistan. IDPs who return to their
place of origin without land or are
unable to recover lost property will
often not settle in their place of origin
but go to relatives in another area
who have a house or land. A lack of
settlement resources will lead IDPs to
become secondary migrants, seeking
‘a place’ elsewhere. This phenomenon
has been duly noted in Cambodia. 
This question of ‘establishing a place’
can also be applied to nomads, who in
Afghanistan for example suffer most
from insufficient water resources.
When Kuchi transhumants in IDP
camps in southern Afghanistan were
asked whether they had a place of ori-
gin or a place to which they wished to
return, many would say that they
wished to relocate to Helmand
province because there is “water in
that place” or they have distant rela-
tives who are settled there. Others
wanted to remain in the IDP camp for
an indefinite period. Recognising that
water and animals would be scarce to
come by for some time, someone said
he wished “to keep the house I built
here in Zhare Dhast and learn to work”.
The idea of a ‘self-selected community
of choice’ recognises that return is
not a viable option for everyone and
that other forms of forced settlement,
such as villagisation in Rwanda,
should not be an acceptable standard
of settlement by the international
community. This idea of a self-select-
ed community could also apply to a
camp situation like Zhare Dhast,
where 50% of camp residents are hop-
ing to reside permanently should the
central government give rights for the
use of land. 
Do IDPs have a say?
While previous definitions of an end
to displacement do stipulate that the
views of IDPs should also take prece-
dence in determining when
displacement ends, most of FMR 17’s
discussion focused on when the inter-
national community could safely
make the determination that the dis-
placed have ceased to be so. Who is
and who is not an IDP matters most
to the international community, in so
much as humanitarian agencies have
limits on whom they can assist and
how much assistance can be given, so
that logical decisions to exclude cer-
tain persons become necessary. 
In the aid world, IDPs often have little
say in determining how they are
regarded and how they will be assist-
ed. The problem of local people
coming into IDP camps to seek mater-
ial assistance is widespread
throughout Afghanistan and has
caused agencies, with limited
resources, to come up with IDP status
determination guidelines that can
exclude certain persons from both
assistance and camp residence. As I
was walking around Shaidyee camp
just outside Herat with the local camp
manager, a woman showed us a piece
of paper that explained she was not
an IDP and was thus not eligible to
receive food allocations from the
World Food Programme or to live in
the camp. The woman asked, "How
can they say I am not an IDP? I am not
from here and I cannot leave here. My
son is very sick and is in the camp
clinic for treatment." While there may
have been legitimate reasons for deny-
ing this particular person assistance,
her reaction to the news highlights
the increasing insensitivity that inter-
national agencies show to the
individual circumstances of displaced
persons in the face of overwhelming
need.   
Protection for the internally
displaced
The most engaging debate on when
displacement ends concerned how to
determine when IDPs no longer
required protection and whether the
1951 refugee convention cessation
clauses could be apply to IDPs.
UNHCR’s position emphasised that no
legal need to declare an end to inter-
nal displacement exists. Yet, UNHCR’s
perspective came largely from draw-
ing an analogy between an end to
displacement and refugee return,
stipulating that persons are of
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concern until they are fully integrated
into the local community, enjoy a
normal livelihood in safety and digni-
ty and have equal access of protection
from the national authorities.
UNHCR, like some other contributors,
also stated that a removal of the root
causes of displacement is an essential
factor to determining displacement’s
end. Bonoan also pointed out that the
refugee cessation clauses, stipulating
that there has to be a fundamental
change of circumstances in the place
of origin, lend guidance to an answer.
However, Cohen rightly reminds us
that a fundamental change in the
political conditions which led to dis-
placement do not always make it
possible for IDPs to then return or
resettle. While Cohen uses the exam-
ple of Tajikistan to illustrate this
point, numerous other examples can
be drawn from Rwanda, East Timor
and Afghanistan. 
IDP protection in southern
Afghanistan
Let us look at the example of
Afghanistan more closely, drawing
from the Informed Decision Making
(IDM) project carried out by the
International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC) in Kandahar
under the auspices of UNHCR from
November 2002 to May 2003. The pro-
ject aimed to find those displaced
people located in five major camp
locations in the south who originated
from the western provinces to deter-
mine whether they wished to remain
in their displacement location, return
to their area of origin or seek alterna-
tive settlement options.
The IDM programme first began work-
ing with camp populations from
Badghis province, an area northwest
of Herat where fighting between the
Taliban and Northern Alliance forces
in early 2002 was particularly acute,
leading thousands of ethnic Pashtuns
from the area to flee to the southern
provinces. UNHCR offices in Kabul,
Herat and Kandahar believed that
Pashtuns from Badghis who were not
politically involved in
the Taliban regime
could return to their
communities of origin
in safety and dignity.
They came to this con-
clusion for two reasons;
firstly because Taliban
and Northern Alliance
fighting in Badghis had
come to an end and
secondly because
UNHCR’s Field Officer
in Badghis province
reported that no major
protection issues in the
area impeded the safe
return of non-political
persons.  
As the Programme
Manager for the IDM
project, I was able to
locate substantial infor-
mation in returnee
monitoring reports on
whether material, edu-
cational and health
resources were avail-
able at the district level
in Badghis. However, I
could not locate any
factual evidence that there were no
ongoing, low-level conflicts in the
area. However, such protection indica-
tors were aptly supplied by the IDPs
themselves. The project found that
more than half of the IDPs in Zhare
Dhast camp feared local commanders
who took their women, homes, ani-
mals and other possessions during
the period of Taliban-Northern
Alliance fighting. They wanted to
know whether specific individuals
were present in their places of origin,
whether they were occupying their
property and especially if they were
part of new government forces.
The IDM project team collected the
names of 28 local commanders
impeding the return of hundreds of
families who would otherwise like to
return. This information was given to
the UNHCR office in Kandahar, with
the suggestion that the UNHCR office
in the west provide information con-
cerning these individuals for
dissemination to the IDPs. The infor-
mation was disregarded, based on the
fact that the ‘circumstances which led
to displacement had fundamentally
changed’.
Yet, many IDPs felt that conditions in
their place of origin had not funda-
mentally changed since the time of
flight. While they recognised that
major fighting between Taliban and
Northern Alliance had ceased, they
were aware of low-level conflict
between commanders that I could not
confirm from other sources. Although
UNHCR felt this information was not
credible, several weeks after reporting
the IDPs’ concerns, fighting broke out
between commanders in two districts
of Badghis which led the UN to evacu-
ate its staff from the entire province.
An important lesson was learned
here. The factors by which displaced
people make the decision to return or
not are more intricate than those
which can be determined from a
checklist survey. The quantitative
facts that are gathered from asking
IDPs more probing questions about
the situation in their place of origin
can unearth important political indi-
cators that could be easily overlooked
without such investigation.
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Conclusion
Does internal displacement end? Yes
for some, no for others. The case of
southern Afghanistan shows that
some people ‘establish a place’ based
on where they build a home, have
water or find relatives; others who
wish to return to where they had
property or livelihoods may be wait-
ing for some time before they can
find out whether return to their area
is safe or not. Ironically, camp life has
informally ended internal displace-
ment for some, though such people
remain under UNHCR auspices and
wait for the new government to for-
mally grant land ownership rights.
While rain will end internal displace-
ment for others, many will remain
displaced until they rest assured that
return will not subject them to future
discrimination and loss.   
Sarah Petrin is a former
Programme Manager for the
International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC) in
Afghanistan. 
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FMR16 had an article on
Sudanese refugees in Cairo (‘In
‘closed file’ limbo: displaced
Sudanese in a Cairo slum’ by
Pascale Ghazaleh). Below are
edited versions of comments
received by Vincent Cochetel,
former Acting Representative,
UNHCR Cairo, and a reply from
the author.
appreciate the time spent by Ms
Ghazaleh in her research and the
interest shown by FMR to examine
the plight of Sudanese asylum seekers
being denied refugee status in Cairo. 
However, the statement that UNHCR
admits using a restrictive refugee def-
inition at its office in Cairo is not
accurate. UNHCR Cairo applies all
refugee definitions in accord with its
mandated Refugee Status
Determination (RSD) procedures. The
fact that someone was an IDP in
Sudan prior to coming to Egypt does
not mean that article 1.2 of the 1969
OAU Convention, governing the spe-
cific aspects of refugee problems in
Africa, applies automatically. A large
number of former Sudanese IDPs are
recognised as refugees by UNHCR.
Others are not because their refugee
claim does not fall within the scope of
exiting refugee definitions or because
their refugee claim seriously lacks
credibility.
My question "why don’t they move
on?" should not have been taken out
of context. I was referring to the fact
that several asylum seekers, who had
been denied an appeal refugee status,
choose every week to return to Sudan
by steamer via Wadi Halfa (and were
observed doing so). This suggests that
not all "rejected asylum seekers" are
stranded in Egypt.
My comment "no one had forced these
people to come to Egypt" should not
have been negatively presented. The
UNHCR Office in Cairo has not pre-
vented any asylum seeker from
coming to Egypt to apply for refugee
status. Many asylum seekers, who
were for many years IDPs in Sudan,
have moved to Egypt because they
were dissatisfied with the decreasing
assistance programmes there or unre-
alistic prospects of resettlement via
UNHCR Cairo. Many have been materi-
ally assisted and encouraged,
including by aid organisations, to
leave Sudan to become asylum seek-
ers in Egypt. For those not qualifying
for refugee status, their move to the
Cairo slum of Arba’a wa Nuss results
in a lowering of their standards of liv-
ing and an increased need for
protection.
I have been attributed a quote on
"clientelism", which should also be
contextualised. Many refugees and
asylum seekers coming from Sudan
have reported to UNHCR Cairo how
various forms of religious clientelism
are favoured by some Christian or
Muslim aid groups in Sudan. Those
practising traditional African religions
are the most exposed to such unethi-
cal approaches. This practice of
creating religious dependence does
not exist in Egypt. Church groups are
providing, in a remarkable manner,
assistance to refugees and asylum
seekers in Egypt irrespective of their
religion, ethnic background or nation-
ality. Without their committed
involvement in humanitarian relief
efforts the life and well being of
refugees and asylum seekers in Cairo
would be in serious jeopardy. UNHCR
hopes that Muslim and Coptic charita-
ble organisations in Egypt will in the
near future start to take a similar
interest in providing support to all
persons in need of basic humanitarian
consideration.
Vincent Cochetel 
Email: cochetel@unhcr.ch
s a journalist, I am always
careful to transcribe inter-
views accurately and check my
sources. The topic of Sudanese
refugees in Egypt – and RSD proce-
dures applied to them – is of great
sensitivity to the Egyptian authorities,
UNHCR and the church groups which
provide assistance. Any discussion of
this subject is certain to arouse objec-
tions.
I am delighted that Mr Cochetel has
agreed to qualify the comments he
made to me that "they [Sudanese
refugees] don't have to come here."
When I cited this comment I neither
stated nor implied that UNHCR had
prevented anyone from coming to
Egypt. If anyone is to blame for pre-
venting displaced people from
crossing borders it is the Egyptian
and Sudanese governments. With
regard to religious clientelism, editing
of the version of the article which
appeared in FMR removed references
to the ‘slave emancipation’ movement
and thus allowed no scope for dis-
cussing clientelism within Sudan.
Clientelism is an accurate term for the
tendency of various religious organi-
sations to privilege their members
when distributing material assistance. 
Pascale Ghazaleh 
Email: ghazaleh@link.net
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